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Drinking water, beaches, a livable climate, clean air, forests, fisheries, and
parks are all commons, shared by many users with diffuse and overlapping inter-
ests. These public natural resources are susceptible to depletion, overuse, erosion,
and extinction; and they are under increasing pressures to become privatized. The
Public Trust Doctrine provides a legal basis to guard against privatizing impor-
tant public resources or commons. As such, it is a critical doctrine to counter the
ever-increasing enclosure and privatization of the commons as well as ensure
government trustees protect current and future generations. This Article considers
separation of powers and statutory interpretation in cases involving attempted
privatizations of public natural resources. Judges use a wide variety of interpre-
tive tools when ruling on the meaning of a statute or legality of an administrative
agency’s action. This Article explores the role of the judiciary in protecting the
public interest in natural resources when a privatization appears to be underway.
It analyzes cases from the United States, India, Uganda, Kenya, and the Philip-
pines to demonstrate the multi-jurisdictional use of what should be recognized as
a substantive canon of statutory interpretation for nature’s trust, seeking a clear
statement from the legislature finding no substantial impact on the public interest
before allowing privatization. Such an approach furthers democracy by ensuring
elected representatives have publicly considered and expressed their intent to au-
thorize a privatization of nature’s trust and that such action is in the public
interest. This moves the locus of decision-making away from administrative
agencies and back to the democratically elected law making body. And once
squarely inside the political branch it requires clarity about the action undertaken
and a finding consistent with the trustee’s duties to the public. Lastly, it explores
the political question doctrine as it relates to controversies about privatizing na-
ture’s trust and shows the power of framing the status quo.
* Melissa K. Scanlan is a Professor of Law and Director of the New Economy Law
Center at Vermont Law School. The author thanks the IUCNAEL for inviting her to present
this work at their conference in Oslo, Norway, in 2016. She thanks her able research
assistant, Susan Scaggs, for her tireless attention to detail.
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INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine encompasses the concept that the sovereign
holds shared or common resources in trust for the public’s use and enjoy-
ment. Like private trusts, the public trust has an identified trustee (the
government), beneficiaries who do not own the resource but share it (every
member of the public), and trust property (the commons).
The public trust doctrine guards against privatizing important public
resources or commons. As such, it is a critical doctrine to counter the ever-
increasing privatization through enclosure and pollution of the commons
such as the climate, air, water, and forests. In his seminal 1970 article, Pro-
fessor Joseph Sax argued that the courts should take a more exacting review
of a government trustee’s decisions when a case involves: (1) diffuse public
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uses threatened by resource alienation below market value; (2) giving pri-
vate interests the power to make public resource decisions; or (3) reallocat-
ing public uses to private uses.1 These situations call for skepticism and less
deferential judicial review of the government trustee’s actions.
Professor Sax identified a judicial presumption that the trustee cannot
privatize public resources without a clear statutory directive and analyzed
cases in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California that showed this in oper-
ation.2 Much of this analysis ties back to the lodestar 1892 case, Illinois
Central, where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Illinois legislature’s re-
scission of a grant to a private railroad corporation of the bed of Lake Mich-
igan in the Chicago Harbor.3 The Court described Illinois’ title to the land
under the harbor’s water as one held in trust for the people and ruled that
attempting to transfer the entire property to the railroad was inconsistent
with the state’s duty as a trustee.4 Courts have interpreted Illinois Central
over time—and in a wide variety of jurisdictions in the United States and
elsewhere—as a restriction on the trustee to not substantially impair the
public interest in the remaining trust resources when taking action to priva-
tize.5 Do the lessons of Illinois Central teach that the courts will make the
legislative and executive branch trustees judicially accountable? And can the
courts go beyond a prohibition against substantial impairment to place
mandatory obligations on the trustees?
Building on this foundation, this Article argues that the legislative and
executive branch trustees should be judicially accountable for managing
trust resources. Judges use a wide variety of interpretive tools when ruling
on the meaning of a statute or the legality of an administrative agency’s
action. Greater court scrutiny is necessary when there appears to be a priva-
tization of public trust resources, especially when there is an irreplaceable
resource (such as old growth rainforest), a tipping point (such as global
climate change), or a less protected public interest (such as the rights of
future generations) at stake.
This Article explores the judiciary’s role in protecting the public inter-
est in natural resources when a privatization appears to be underway. It
1. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 561-63 (1970). This and many subsequent pieces by Prof.
Sax heralded a renewed interest in developing the public trust doctrine by courts, legisla-
tures, and academics, which first centered on the U.S. and then spread to other countries.
2. See id. at 491-545.
3. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 463-64 (1892).
4. Id. at 452-53.
5. See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988); Ariz.
Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Glass v.
Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005); M.C. Mehta v. Nath, 10 SCR 12, 13-14 (1996).
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analyzes cases from countries on three continents to demonstrate that the
multi-jurisdictional use of the Illinois Central “no substantial impairment”
test should be recognized as a substantive canon of statutory interpretation.
In short, this Article argues that courts should apply a judicial presumption
that the state cannot privatize public trust resources without a clear statu-
tory directive and a legislative finding that the action would not “substan-
tially impair” the public interest. Review of agency action should face a
heightened “close look” with the burden of proof on an applicant to show
the public interest is protected.
Such a rule of interpretation furthers democracy by ensuring elected
representatives have publicly considered and expressed their intent to au-
thorize a privatization of trust resources before it occurs.6 This moves the
locus of decision-making from administrative agencies back to the demo-
cratically elected legislature.7 And once squarely inside the political branch
it requires legislative clarity about the action undertaken and a finding con-
sistent with the duties the trustee has to the public.
Following this introduction, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part I
opens by discussing shared public resources as “commons” and describes the
scope of commons protected by the public trust doctrine in five countries.
Part II explains the role of the judiciary in reviewing attempted privatiza-
tions and revisits the origins and meaning of the “no substantial impair-
ment” test that courts apply in public trust cases. The Article places this test
in the context of other interpretative canons and the role of judges inter-
preting statutes. Part III argues for recognition of the “no substantial im-
pairment” test as a substantive canon of interpretation related to protected
public trust resources. The Article shows how courts in the United States,
India, Kenya, and Uganda require a clear statement from the legislature
regarding privatizations of important public resources. Part IV explores the
political question doctrine as it relates to controversies about privatizing
common resources and analyzes cases from the United States and the Phil-
ippines to show how the understanding of the status quo impacts the po-
tency of this justiciability issue. The Article concludes that the political
question doctrine ceases to be a viable obstacle to adjudicating controversies
about privatizing nature’s trust when the court understands its role in the
trustee relationships and the status quo as protecting the commons from
privatization.
6. See Sax, supra note 1, at 498-99.
7. See id.
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I. SHARED COMMONS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE’S SCOPE
IN FIVE COUNTRIES
We are surrounded by and interact with commons regularly in our lives
but may not always recognize it. Some everyday examples include drinking
water, and its corollary, sewage; forests; parks; rivers, lakes, and oceans;
beaches; fish; air; and climate.  These commons are shared. Their uses and
users overlap and interconnect. The users are plentiful and have diffuse
interests, which makes them difficult to organize. Decisions about their use
can cause even greater harm to future generations, who are un- or under-
represented in the decision-making process. Meanwhile, the resources are
susceptible to depletion, overuse, erosion, or extinction. Some are irreplace-
able, such as old growth rainforest. Some involve tipping points, such as the
global climate.
In response to challenges posed by sharing the commons, people advo-
cate for actions that tend to fall into three categories: educate, regulate, or
privatize. One form of regulation of the commons that has existed for cen-
turies in a variety of countries is use of the public trust doctrine to define
the relationships between the trustee, beneficiaries, and the shared com-
mons to be managed by the trustee.
Courts and legislatures have articulated the trust property boundaries
over time to reflect resources of importance to the public. Modern public
trust doctrine often quotes the Institutes of Justinian from ancient Roman
law, which is associated with natural law, the concept of the commons, in
the shared air, water, shores below the high tide, and fish.8 “Under Roman
law . . . the great waters and the lands below the highest tide were not only
publicly owned, but they were considered in the class of things incapable of
private ownership.”9 In England at the time of colonizing America, the
monarch’s public trust focused on tidal waters and their shores to be used by
the commoners.10
A. Scope in the United States
When the colonies broke from England and formed the United States,
courts similarly described the protected public trust as tidal waters and their
shores.11 As the fledgling United States expanded westward, the Supreme
Court expanded the trust’s scope to protect the public interest in navigable
8. See Sax, at 475; Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty:
The Historic Basis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 861, 870-77 (2007).
9. Abrams, supra note 8, at 880.
10. See id. at 883-84.
11. See id. at 884-86.
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freshwaters and non-navigable tidal waters.12 Although today the public
trust doctrine varies by state, the scope of the protected trust in some states
now includes beaches, groundwater, wetlands, non-navigable tributaries,
parks, air, and all public natural resources.13
In the blockbuster of all privatizations to date, the global climate is
threatened by excessive greenhouse gas emissions that may have already
pushed this global commons past tipping points. In 2013, leading climatolo-
gist Dr. James Hansen warned the fossil fuel emission rate would need to
decrease by 6 percent a year beginning immediately to return to 350 parts
per million of atmospheric CO2 by 2100.
14 In August of 2015, frustrated
with lackluster federal action to accomplish this goal, 21 youth plaintiffs and
Dr. Hansen sued the federal government for allowing and encouraging in-
creases in carbon emissions over the past fifty years, despite knowledge of
global climate change.15 In Juliana v. United States, the plaintiffs claimed the
federal government violated their constitutional due process and public
trust rights and demanded that the government design and implement a
plan to slash carbon emissions.16
In November 2016, the Federal District Court of Oregon denied a mo-
tion to dismiss and allowed the plaintiffs’ case to move forward on their
public trust doctrine and substantive due process claims, noting that the
action is of a different order than the typical environmental case because it
“alleges that defendants’ actions and inactions—whether or not they violate
any specific statutory duty—have so profoundly damaged our home planet
12. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1870) (finding that navigable rivers were
public navigable rivers in law); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484
(1988) (finding that State interest in non-navigable tidal waters was established at the time
of admission to the Union).
13. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892) (navigable waters and
submerged lands); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363, 380-81 (Cal.
1980) (tidelands); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727-28 (Cal. 1983)
(non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65-69, 78
(Mich. 2005) (beaches below ordinary high water mark); Matthews v. Bay Head Improve-
ment Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363-66 (N.J. 1984) (dry sand beaches above high tide); In re
Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 467 (Haw. 2000) (groundwater); Lake Beulah
Mgmt. Dist. v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 799 N.W.2d 73, 84-85, 88 (Wis. 2011) (ground-
water hydrologically connected to navigable water); Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761,
769 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121-22
(Mass. 1966) (state park); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050,
1053 (N.Y. 2001) (park); HAW. CONST. of 1959, art. XI, § 1 (all public natural resources); TEX.
CONST. of 1876, art. XVI, § 59(a) (all natural resources).
14. James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of
Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec.
2013, at 10.
15. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016).
16. Id.
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that they threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to life and
liberty.”17 The starting point for the court’s analysis was the concept that
“‘public trust’ refers to the fundamental understanding that no government
can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers.”18 The court further
addressed several significant legal questions including: whether the oceans
are a public trust asset, whether the federal government has public trust
obligations, whether federal statutes have displaced any common-law public
trust claims, and whether plaintiffs have a right of action to enforce public
trust obligations.19 The court answered all but the displacement issue in the
affirmative.20
Although the Oregon District Court did not foreclose the atmosphere
being part of the public trust, it focused its decision instead on the question
of whether the oceans are a public trust asset. The plaintiffs alleged viola-
tions of the public trust doctrine in connection with the territorial sea to
which the federal government holds title through ownership of the sub-
merged lands between three and twelve miles from the coastlines of the
United States.21 Because a number of plaintiffs’ injuries relate to the effects
of ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures, the court held they
have adequately alleged harm to public trust assets—something the court
called the “natural resources trust.”22
On the question of whether the federal government has public trust
obligations, the Oregon District Court rejected prior interpretations of the
meaning of the Supreme Court’s statements in PPL Montana, which limited
the public trust doctrine to matters of state law. “There is no reason why the
central tenets of Illinois Central should apply to another state, but not to the
federal government.”23 The court found persuasive federal court decisions
from the District of Massachusetts and the Northern District of California,
which decided that there is a federal public trust. The court concluded that
the “federal government, like the states, holds public assets—at a minimum,
the territorial seas—in trust for the people.”24
17. Id. at 1261.
18. Id. at 1252.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 1259.
21. Id. at 1255. The federal government holds title to the submerged lands between
three and twelve miles from the coastlines of the United States.
22. Id. at 1254.
23. Id. at 1256-57.
24. Id. at 1258-59 (citing United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124
(D. Mass. 1981); Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal.
1986)).
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To the question of whether federal statutes have displaced federal pub-
lic trust claims, the Oregon District Court answered in the negative and
distinguished the public trust from tort claims.25 Specifically, the court
found that “[p]ublic trust claims are unique because they concern inherent
attributes of sovereignty” and that the “public trust imposes on the govern-
ment an obligation to protect the res of the trust.”26 State and federal legis-
lators cannot “legislate[ ] away” that obligation “[b]ecause of the nature of
public trust claims.”27
Finally, on the right of action question, the Oregon District Court held
that the “plaintiffs’ public trust claims are properly categorized as substan-
tive due process claims,” and thus, the Fifth Amendment provides them
with a right of action in this case.28 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause bars the federal government from depriving a person of “life, liberty,
or property” without “due process of law.”29 The Juliana plaintiffs alleged
that defendants violated their due process rights by “directly caus[ing] at-
mospheric CO2 to rise to levels that dangerously interfere with a stable
climate system required alike by our nation and Plaintiffs;” “knowingly en-
danger[ing] Plaintiffs’ health and welfare by approving and promoting fossil
fuel development, including exploration, extraction, production, transporta-
tion, importation, exportation, and combustion;” and, “[a]fter knowingly
creating this dangerous situation for Plaintiffs, . . . continu[ing] to know-
ingly enhance that danger by allowing fossil fuel production, consumption,
and combustion at dangerous levels.”30
A reviewing court applies strict scrutiny “when the government in-
fringes on a “ ‘fundamental right’” that is protected by the Constitution.31
“Substantive due process ‘forbids the government to infringe certain “fun-
damental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.’”32 Because the Oregon District Court concluded that plaintiffs alleged
a violation of their fundamental rights, it did not address whether youth or
future generations are suspect classifications for equal protection purposes,
25. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (distinguished from Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 412 (2011) which involved a claim based on both federal law and
nuisance torts).
26. Id. at 1260.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1261.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1248-49 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)).
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which would have provided a separate basis for strict scrutiny judicial
review.33
The Oregon District Court examined whether the plaintiffs had a fun-
damental liberty right in a “climate system capable of sustaining human
life.”34 Referencing the recent Supreme Court case upholding same-sex
marriage,35 the court had “no doubt” that plaintiffs’ liberty right is “funda-
mental to a free and ordered society.”36
The court cautioned that it was not transforming any pollution or cli-
mate change into a violation of a fundamental constitutional right.37 Ac-
cordingly, the court restricted its holding to allow a claim for a due process
violation “where a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively
and substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause
human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to
property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s
ecosystem.”38 In Juliana, the court found that plaintiffs adequately alleged
such a claim and may proceed to trial on the issues.39
If the plaintiffs win, the court could order the federal government to
take specific action to mitigate climate change. Although the Due Process
Clause does not typically impose on the government an affirmative obliga-
tion to act, here the court held the plaintiffs’ cause of action met the “danger
creation” exception; due to the government’s failure to limit third-party
CO2 emissions it “places a person in peril in deliberate indifference to their
safety[.]”40 In order to prevail on the danger-creation due process claim at
the summary judgment or trial phase, the plaintiffs will need to show: “(1)
the government’s acts created the danger to the plaintiff; (2) the govern-
ment knew its acts caused that danger; and (3) the government with deliber-
ate indifference failed to act to prevent the alleged harm.”41
Although the case has survived its first major challenge, the litigants
have a steep road ahead that will include complicated discovery and ques-
tions of proof. Juliana will test the judicial role in providing a check on
government trustees of nature’s trust, especially in light of the Trump Ad-
ministration, which has aggressively moved to reject climate science and the
33. Id. at 1249 n.7.
34. Id. at 1250.





40. Id. at 1250-52 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 1252.
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prior administration’s policies to reduce greenhouse gases.42 If ultimately
successful, Juliana will have recognized an expanded scope of the public
trust doctrine in the United States, grounded in the U.S. Constitution, with
judicially enforceable federal government trustee duties.
While other countries have less of a judicial history of interpreting the
public trust doctrine than the United States, their more recent articulation
of the doctrine tends to be more inclusive of all commons or natural re-
sources. In that light, the Oregon District Court’s use of “natural resources
trust” and grounding in the U.S. Constitution in Juliana is catching up with
countries in Asia and Africa.
B. Scope in the Philippines and India
Since the 1990s, Asian supreme courts have grappled with the public
trust doctrine and sought to define its scope. Among them, courts in the
Philippines and India have dealt with seminal cases defining the doctrine
and its scope.
In the Philippines, the protected public trust covers all natural re-
sources: “forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, [and] wildlife” are part of
the constitutionally protected right to a “balanced and healthful ecology.”43
Similarly, in India, the public trust encompasses “all eco-systems oper-
ating in our natural resources.”44 In M.C. Mehta v. Nath, the Indian Su-
preme Court summarized the public trust doctrine as follows:
Our legal system . . . includes the public trust doctrine as part of its
jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources,
which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. [The]
[p]ublic at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters,
airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is
under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources
meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.45
The Indian Supreme Court based this all-inclusive natural resources scope
of the trust on several findings. First, the Court noted that environmental
science provides us with certain laws of nature that cannot be changed by
42. See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-cli-
mate-agreement.html.
43. Oposa v. The Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 224
S.C.R.A. 792, 803 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.) (interpreting Philippine Constitution, sections 15
& 16); see also CONST. (1987), art. II, § 16 (Phil.).
44. M.C. Mehta v.  Nath, 10 SCR 12, 13 (1996).
45. Id. at 13.
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legislative fiat, and that an “understanding of the laws of nature must there-
fore inform all of our social institutions.”46 Second, the public trust doctrine
rests on the principle that the “air, sea, waters and the forests have such a
great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjusti-
fied to make them a subject of private ownership” and that “being a gift of
nature, [t]hey should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of
their status in life.”47
The Indian courts have had the opportunity to apply the public trust
doctrine to a wide variety of public resources: riverbed alteration, a state-
owned forest, a public park, groundwater, a beach access path 200 meters
from the high tide line, natural gas, and even 2G wireless wavelengths.48
C. Scope in Kenya and Uganda
Courts across the African continent have also wielded the public trust
doctrine in environmental cases. Decisions from the high courts of Kenya
and Uganda illustrate the expanding scope of the doctrine internationally.
In Kenya, the High Court of Nairobi interpreted the constitutional pro-
tection of the right to life as a right to a clean and healthy environment,
recognizing the government as a trustee of the environment that had a duty
to protect water from sewage contamination.49 Further, Article 62 of the
46. Id. at 37 (quoting David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for
Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 311, 316 (1988)).
47. Id. at 38.
48. Id. at 15-16 (1997) (state-owned forest); M.I. Builders Private Ltd. v. Radley
Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 464, 466 (India) (public park); Perumatty Grama Panchayat v.
State, (2004) 1 KLT 731, ¶ 34 (Kerala HC) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1161084/
(reversed on appeal by Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages v. Perumatty Grama Panchayat,
(2005) 2 KLT 554 (Kerala HC), pending final determination in the Supreme Court of India
(groundwater); W. Bengal v. Kesoram Indus. Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 1646, 1743 (2004) (India)
(groundwater); Fomento Resorts & Hotels v. Martins, (2009) 1 Unreported Judgments
2009, 0411, 0430 (India) (beach access path 200 meters from the high tide line); Reliance
Nat. Res., Ltd. v. Reliance Indus., Ltd., (2010) INSC 374, ¶ 97-99 (India) (natural gas); Ctr.
for Pub. Interest Litig. v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCR 147 (India) (2G wireless
wavelengths). The Center for Public Interest Litigation sued the Union of India for selling
various wireless wavelengths on the 2G spectrum on a first-come-first-served basis rather
than by auction, as well as to applicants who were “ineligible.” “Natural resources belong to
the people but the State legally owns them on behalf of its people.” Id. at 161. People must
have equal access to natural resources and be adequately compensated for transfers; if the
state is transferring a resource, the procedure must be “just, non-arbitrary, and transparent”
and it must not “discriminate between similarly placed parties.” Id. at 246.
49. Waweru v. Republic, (2007) AHRLR 149 (KeHC 2006) (H.C.K.) (Kenya). The
2010 Kenyan Constitution added Article 42, protecting a right to a clean and healthy
environment.
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Kenyan Constitution describes the national government as the “trustee” of
public lands.50
Similarly, in Uganda, the High Court of Uganda at Kampala inter-
preted Article 237(2)(b) of the 1995 Constitution as enshrining the public
trust doctrine.51 That provision recognizes the government as “hold[ing] in
trust” and protecting “natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game
reserves, National parks, and any land to be reserved for ecological and
tourist purposes for the common good of all citizens.”52 The court considers
these constitutional trust rights “fundamental” constitutional rights.53
Thus, as courts in the United States, Philippines, India, Kenya, and
Uganda—spread across three continents—show, the scope of protected pub-
lic trust resources is broad enough to include all natural resources that are a
shared commons. This all-inclusive scope of protected trust resources can be
called “nature’s trust.”54 Of course, these same protected resources are
claimed for commercial products or private estates for those who would
fence out the public or take from the public domain for private commercial
production. Further, these commons are regularly used for the private dis-
posal of waste in the form of polluted water, dirty air, and excess green-
house gases. So what is a court’s role when such enclosures or damages to
the commons come before it? What is the role of the legislative or executive
trustee? Are there judicially enforceable standards to which the trustee must
adhere? Should courts abstain from deciding a public trust doctrine case
based on the political question doctrine? How are these questions informed
by separation of powers considerations?
II. PRESUMPTIONS AND BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When courts review statutes they are operating in the context of the
checks and balances built into a government of separated powers. In the
United States, the judiciary’s role in interpreting the law has been well es-
tablished since the 1803 Supreme Court decision in Marbury v. Madison.55
50. CONSTITUTION art. 62 (2010) (Kenya).
51. Advocates Coal. for Dev. & Env’t v. Attorney Gen. (ACODE), (2004) Misc.
Cause No. 0100, 14 (Uganda), https://www.elaw.org/content/uganda-advocates-coalition-
development-and-environment-acode-v-attorney-general (citing CONSTITUTION art. 237(2)(b)
(1995) (Uganda)).
52. Id. at 14.
53. See id. at 11-13 (citing CONSTITUTION art. 50 (1995) (Uganda)).
54. See Mary Christina Wood, The Nature’s Trust Paradigm for a Sustaining Economy, in
LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ECONOMY: SUSTAINABLE, JUST, AND DEMOCRATIC ch. 5 (Melissa K.
Scanlan ed., 2017).
55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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This is not to say the contours of that role have been clearly defined. Over
time, judges have gravitated towards different theories of statutory inter-
pretation, from purposivism to textualism and beyond, each giving a differ-
ent degree of weight to evidence that falls outside the text of the statute.
These theories, however, are all rooted in a common attempt to be Con-
gress’s faithful agent in interpreting the law.
Interpretive guidelines for statutory construction are well known in ju-
dicial review of public law, and have been deeply ingrained in Anglo-Ameri-
can courts for at least a hundred years.56 Colloquially known as canons, they
went into a period of infrequent use after Karl Llewellyn’s famous 1950
article, which paired canons that directly contradicted each other.57 Despite
their shortcomings, canons are a standard tool for today’s courts to aid stat-
utory interpretation. While the semantic canons focus on grammar and syn-
tax, linguistic inferences, and textual integrity, the substantive canons
reflect a set of background principles and presumptions that influence the
judiciary’s construction of a statute.
A. Substantive Canons Involving Clear Statements
Many of the substantive canons operate as a clear statement of rules or
presumptions, for example: “Unless the legislature clearly intends to dis-
place an established background understanding, the court will presume that
the understanding is part of the statute.”58 A well-known example of such a
canon is constitutional avoidance. This canon reflects the understanding
that each branch of government has a duty to uphold the Constitution, so
there is a strong presumption that Congress created a law that it intended
to be consistent with the Constitution. This canon comes into play if a
statute is subject to multiple interpretations, one of which raises serious
constitutional problems. Unless Congress has clearly shown it intended the
problematic construction, this canon urges courts to construe the statute to
avoid an interpretation that raises serious constitutional problems.59 The
56. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1011 (1989).
57. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
58. See Eskridge, supra note 56, at 1011; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 593 (1992) (cataloguing and discussing various substantive canons of interpretation).
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988): “ ‘[W]here an otherwise ac-
ceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will
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leading case for this is NLRB v. Catholic Bishops, where the U.S. Supreme
Court, concerned about constitutional problems with the First Amend-
ment’s religious clauses, declined to interpret expansive statutory language
to include Catholic schools within the statute’s term “employer” without a
clear statement from Congress directing the agency to assert jurisdiction
over religious schools.60
Of course there are detractors and supporters of this canon, an in-depth
treatment of which is unnecessary for this Article. Most agree, however,
that the canon shifts power from courts to the legislature.61 Justice Bran-
deis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, de-
scribed a variety of rules of constitutional avoidance all of which have a
common focus on promoting judicial restraint.62 Professor Lisa Klop-
penberg writes that “[t]he Ashwander formulation arose in part as a response
to the activism of the conservative U.S. Supreme Court of the Lochner
era.”63 The canon reflects the notion that courts should interpret laws nar-
rowly when approaching a constitutional boundary.64 The clear statement
requirement advanced in Catholic Bishops goes beyond judicial restraint,
however, and places a greater emphasis on Congress’s responsibility to af-
firmatively address and clarify text that raises constitutional issues.65 The
clear statement formulations have gathered momentum and now appear in a
variety of canons beyond avoiding constitutional problems, including lenity
in criminal cases, avoiding federal infringement on traditional state sover-
eignty, and others.
In sum, the clear statement canons focus attention on the legislature
and demand clear statutory language.66 They heed separation of powers and
federalism concerns, and tamp down charges of judicial activism in the law-
making as opposed to the law-interpreting realm. In one view, the substan-
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress.’ ”).
60. NLRB, 440 U.S. at 507.
61. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial In-
dependence?, 56 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1031 (2006). But see Michelle R. Slack, Avoiding
Avoidance: Why Use of the Constitution Avoidance Canon Undermines Judicial Independence—A
Response to Lisa Kloppenberg, 56 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1057 (2006).
62. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (providing seven rules under which the Court has avoided constitutional
questions. “4. . . . if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitu-
tional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter.”).
63. Kloppenberg, supra note 61, at 1033-34.
64. Eskridge, supra note 56, at 1020-21.
65. Robert W. Scheef, Temporal Dynamics in Statutory Interpretation: Courts, Congress,
and the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 529, 540-44 (2003).
66. Id. at 534, 344.
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tive canons reflect presumptions about Congressional intent. In another
view, these canons advance specific values the courts have determined are
important regardless of the Congressional preference of the day.  For in-
stance, safeguarding areas of traditional state sovereignty against federal in-
cursion.  As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Gregory v. Ashcroft, “[i]n
traditionally sensitive areas . . . the requirement of a clear statement assures
that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
critical matters involved in the judicial decision.”67 Is the sovereign’s trustee
status a traditionally sensitive area that warrants a clear statement from the
legislature before a court will interpret the law in a way that privatizes
nature’s trust? In jurisdictions where the public trust doctrine is protected
by the constitution, is this a variation on the constitutional avoidance
canon?68
B. Substantive Canon for Nature’s Trust
Is there a substantive interpretive canon for nature’s trust? One ap-
proach, proffered by Professor William Araiza, argues for subject matter
exceptionalism in favor of creating an interpretive canon for situations that
involve the application of the public trust doctrine to non-aquatic re-
sources.69 This section describes his proposal, important insights to be bor-
rowed from it, and why this is unnecessarily theoretical. Then it articulates
the “no substantial impairment” clear statement approach to statutory inter-
pretation that can be discerned from the overall pattern of court decisions
from multiple countries involving attempted privatizations of nature’s trust.
This approach has such a wide and longstanding use that it should be recog-
nized as a substantive canon of interpretation when public natural resources
are threatened with privatization.
Professor Araiza proposed the public trust doctrine as an interpretive
canon to mediate the tensions that arise around non-aquatic public trust
resources.70 These tensions stem from broadly shared “instincts about the
relationship of government to the nation’s natural resource heritage” cast
against “an incompletely theorized doctrinal foundation and anxiety about
judicial policy-making on technically complex and socially important is-
67. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
68. E.g., The Constitution of South Carolina provides, “All navigable waters shall for-
ever remain public highways free to the citizens of the State and the United States.” S.C.
CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
69. William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 693, 696 (2012).
70. Id.
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sues.”71 He clarifies that this interpretive canon would only apply to “judi-
cial interpretation of positive law enactments, such as statutes,
administrative regulations and interpretations of those regulations.”72 He
formulates his argument for a public trust canon as follows: “[T]he principle
underlying the public trust doctrine—that ‘social’ uses of natural resources
generate benefits that merit protection—is so important that it warrants
consideration when courts construe laws or review government actions that
affect those uses.”73 As such, he articulates “a background principle, or ca-
non, against which public laws should be construed.”74
Professor Araiza’s construction of this canon continues in a broad vein:
it “might be understood as placing a thumb on the scale in favor of the
public trust value, in whatever form the underlying legal rule prescribes.”75
But his proposal would not apply to aquatic resources.76 He also does not
base it on existing public trust law, despite a rich body of cases in which
judges have already been applying substantive presumptions—albeit often
unarticulated as such—through their public trust jurisprudence.77
Importantly, Professor Araiza grounds the public trust canon in a fun-
damental problem with protecting a commons: the diffuse nature of the
interests involved. Values protected by the public trust doctrine, such as
conservation and public use, tend to be systematically undervalued in the
political process because they accrue to the public generally.78 This problem
of diffuse interests challenges the traditional notion that in a democracy the
political process can be trusted to reflect the public’s preferences; instead
suggesting a problem of diffuse majorities. Mancur Olson, Jr. described the
concept of diffuse majorities in his 1965 book on public goods and collective
action, which challenged the concept that the greatest concern in a democ-
racy was the tyranny of the majority.79 He brought to the fore the problem
of concentrated benefits for the few and diffuse costs for the many. In this
foundational book Olson delves into the academic and judicial history of the
concept. Then as recounted by Araiza:
[Bruce] Ackerman called for courts to recognize the relative politi-
cal weakness suffered not by “discrete and insular” minorities, as
71. Id. at 697.
72. Id. at 698 (noting interpretive canons fit uneasily with common law adjudications).
73. Id. at 704.
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 719.
76. Id. at 699.
77. Id. at 698.
78. Id. at 716.
79. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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the [Carolene Products] formula originally stated, but by diffuse mi-
norities, which he argued suffer special handicaps when organizing
politically. Similarly, in its path-breaking decision in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the ease with which publicly-held assets, such as parkland, would be
sacrificed when the alternative was impairment of privately held
assets.80
Thus, diffuse interests in the commons are easily at risk of being underval-
ued in political and administrative processes where focused commercial or
private interests are represented. Awareness of this dynamic of diffuse ma-
jorities as related to nature’s trust should be at the forefront of any public
trust interpretive canon.
When there appears to be a privatization of nature’s trust underway,
courts tend to use a judicial presumption that the trustee cannot privatize
public resources without a clear statutory directive and a legislative finding
that the action would not “substantially impair” the remaining public trust
resources or the public interest.81 This formulation is based on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in the now famous Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois.82 The Supreme Court held that when a state receives title to tidelands
and lands beneath navigable waterways within its borders at the time of its
admission to the Union, it receives such land “in trust for the people of the
State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.”83 The Court noted that the state is entitled
to convey such lands to private parties, only under very limited circum-
stances.84 The Court’s formulation of the test for situations where a state
may privatize trust property is where the privatized resources “are used in
promoting the interests of the public” or “can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters re-
maining.”85 The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted this to mean the
legislature may make grants of public trust property, but must delineate
that the property may only be used for public purposes.86 The Arizona
80. Araiza, supra note 69, at 717 (citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 1, at 494-96; Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215
N.E.2d 114, 121-24 (Mass. 1966); Araiza, supra note 69, at 704.
82. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 453-54.
85. Id. at 452-53.
86. See Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 781-82 (Wis.
1899); see also City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 826 (Wis. 1927) (upholding a
conveyance of submerged Lake Michigan land to a private company because it was “part and
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Court of Appeals interpreted this as an “ancient doctrine of common law
[that] restricts the sovereign’s ability to dispose of resources held in public
trust.”87
In short, the Illinois Central test of a privatization is that the common-
pool resources must be used to promote the public interest or that the
privatization will cause no substantial impairment of the public interest in
the remaining resources. That is a very high bar, given the public trust
responsibility that trustees protect present and future generations.88 It ap-
pears that courts have applied the public trust no substantial impairment
test as they do other substantive canons of statutory interpretation that re-
quire a clear statement from the legislature. For example, applying the con-
stitutional avoidance canon, as explained above, courts narrowly construe a
statute in order to avoid constitutional doubts unless the legislation clearly
states otherwise.89 Likewise, for public trust cases, courts look for a clear
statement from the legislature that the use of the commonly-held resources
promotes the public interest or there is no substantial impairment of the
public interest in the remaining resources. If these conditions are not met,
the privatization fails. For over one hundred years courts throughout the
United States have applied Illinois Central to adjudicate privatizations of
nature’s trust. Other countries around the world, such as India, have simi-
larly borrowed the foundations established in Illinois Central and adapted it
to their public trust jurisprudence.90 The public trust “no substantial im-
pairment” test has been so widely applied in multiple jurisdictions, in a way
that shifts the focus to the legislature in search of a clear statement, that it
should be understood as a substantive canon of interpretation for nature’s
trust.
parcel of a larger scheme,” entirely public in nature, “designed to enable the city to construct
its outer harbor in aid of navigation and commerce”).
87. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991).
88. See, e.g., id. at 170. The Arizona Court of Appeals declared that any dispensation of
public trust lands must satisfy the state’s “special obligation to maintain the trust for the use
and enjoyment of present and future generations.” Id. In India, the Supreme Court articu-
lated this concept in Fomento Resorts & Hotels v. Martins, (2009) 1 Unreported Judgments
2009, 0411, 0451-56 (India). In the Philippines, the Supreme Court articulated this concept
in Oposa v. The Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, 817-
18 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
89. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
90. See M.C. Mehta v. Nath, (1996) 10 SCR 12, 38-39 (India).
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The next section provides examples of the nature’s trust canon from
jurisdictions in the United States, India, Uganda, and Kenya, to show how
courts are implementing it in a variety of social and economic contexts.
III. ROLE OF THE COURTS IN REVIEWING ATTEMPTED
PRIVATIZATIONS OF NATURE’S TRUST
Part III of the Article discusses the role courts have played in various
jurisdictions in reviewing attempted privatizations of nature’s trust. First,
this part provides background into the constitutional powers and limitations
that impact courts’ roles. Then, it establishes the boundaries to agency dis-
cretion as created under the heightened close look standard for nature’s
trust cases. From there, the Article looks into the manner in which courts
across the globe apply the nature’s trust canon of “no substantial impair-
ment.” Although constitutional powers and agency deference varies
throughout the world, courts have played an essential role in protecting
nature’s trust from privatization.
A. Separation of Powers and Judicial Review
At the outset, judicial review needs to be understood in light of separa-
tion of powers and the fundamental need to strengthen democratic legiti-
macy in government institutions. In 1991, litigants asked the Arizona Court
of Appeals to review the validity of legislation that attempted to relinquish
state title in all navigable waterways to private landowners.91 The court
framed the role of the judiciary within a constitutional commitment to the
checks and balances of a government of divided powers; it concluded the
delegates to the Arizona Constitutional Convention “understood and as-
sumed the courts would exercise judicial review” and that they intended this
function as “an additional check on legislative and executive abuse.”92
Separation of powers in the public trust context adds weight to the
judicial role vis-à-vis the political branches. As with a private trust, with the
public trust there are trustees (the political branches of the legislature and
the executive, and agencies with delegated trustee duties), trust property
(which ranges from navigable waters to all natural resources), and benefi-
ciaries (present and future generations). The role of the judiciary in the
public trust context is to protect the beneficiaries’ interests. The Arizona
Court of Appeals noted that “[j]ust as private trustees are judicially account-
able to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res . . . so the legislative and
91. Hassell, 837 P.2d at 161.
92. Id. at 168 (quoting John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1, 74-75 (1988)).
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executive branches are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the
public trust.”93
Judicial review is heightened in public trust cases because the benefi-
ciaries of the public trust are not only diffuse majorities that are typically
under-represented, but include future generations who do not yet have the
right to vote. The res at issue, whether as narrow as navigable waters or as
broad as the global climate, is susceptible to overuse, erosion, and irrepara-
ble harm or extinction. Thus, as the Arizona Court of Appeals suggested,
judicial review needs to provide “a level of protection against improvident
dissipation of an irreplaceable res.”94
B. Heightened Close Look at Agency Actions and
Burden of Proof
The “close look” standard of review is a familiar term of art for assess-
ing the level of scrutiny a court gives to an agency action. However, in
nature’s trust cases, some jurisdictions are using a more exacting standard—
call it a “heightened close look”—to indicate it is one step up in terms of
intensity of review. Here cases from two very different contexts, Idaho and
Hawai’i, are illustrative. In Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle
Yacht Club, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that “decisions made by
non-elected agencies rather than by the legislature itself will be subjected to
closer scrutiny than will legislative decisionmaking.”95 It described the judi-
cial role in adjudicating public trust disputes related to an agency or legisla-
tive action:
Final determination whether the alienation or impairment of a pub-
lic trust resource violates the public trust doctrine will be made by
the judiciary. This is not to say that this court will [substitute] its
judgment for that of the legislature or agency. However, it does
mean that this court will take a “close look” at the action to deter-
mine if it complies with the public trust doctrine and it will not act
merely as a rubber stamp for agency or legislative action.96
At first blush, the Idaho Supreme Court’s description of a “close look” stan-
dard of review does not seem irregular; but they actually applied a higher
level of scrutiny involving a wide variety of factors.97 It is important to
note, that the existence of a heightened close look does not dictate the out-
93. Id. at 169 (citation omitted).
94. Id.
95. Kootenai Envtl. All. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Idaho 1983).
96. Id. at 1092.
97. Factors the Idaho Supreme Court thought relevant for a close look include:
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come of a decision. In the Idaho case, the court ultimately upheld the
agency decision to allow an encroachment into the commons by a private
yacht club.98
Similarly, the Hawaiian Supreme Court explained that cases involving
the public trust doctrine require a heightened close look that is more exact-
ing than the typical standards for agency action.99 The Hawaiian Supreme
Court reasoned that the “special public interests in trust resources demand
that this court observe certain qualifications of its standard of review” and
that this “requires additional rigor.”100 Since the public trust in Hawai’i is
guaranteed by the state constitution, “ultimate authority to interpret and
defend the public trust in Hawai’i rests with the courts of this state.”101
While agencies typically need to support their decisions with evidence,
when an agency performs as a public trustee it is duty bound to demon-
strate that it has properly exercised the discretion vested in it by the consti-
tution and the statute. In matters impacting public trust resources “clarity
in the agency’s decision is all the more essential.”102 The Hawaiian courts
expect more from agencies based on proposed uses of the commons. The
agency “should apply a high level of scrutiny” if the requested use is “private
or commercial” because those are not protected public trust uses.103 This
[T]he degree of effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recre-
ation and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust re-
source; the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively with
existing impediments to full use of the public trust resource, i.e. in this instance
the proportion of the lake taken up by docks, moorings or other impediments; the
impact of the project on the public trust resource when that resource is examined
in light of the primary purpose for which the resource is suited, i.e. commerce,
navigation, fishing or recreation; and the degree to which broad public uses are set
aside in favor of more limited or private ones.
Id. at 1092-93.
98. Id. at 1096.
99. Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Kauai, 324 P.3d 951, 974-75 (Haw.
2014). The typical standard of review for Hawaiian agency actions is arbitrary and capricious
for an exercise of discretion and clearly erroneous for findings of fact or mixed questions of
law and fact. Id. at 974.
100. Id. (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole I), 9 P.3d 409, 445
(2000)).
101. Id. at 975 (quoting Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 445).
102. Id. at 983-84 (quoting Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 470).
103. Id. at 984. The court distilled Hawai’i’s public trust doctrine and expectations of
the agency trustee as follows:
a. The agency’s duty and authority is to maintain the purity and flow of our
waters for future generations and to assure that the waters of our land are put to
reasonable and beneficial use.
b. The agency must determine whether the proposed use is consistent with the
trust purposes:
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level of scrutiny puts a greater burden on the private or commercial use
applicant to demonstrate the proposed use does not conflict with protected
uses of the public trust resource.104 In Hawai’i, an absence of evidence is
insufficient and ultimately weighs against a private or commercial applicant
because a reviewing court is unable to find the level of clarity it needs to
permit uses of public trust resources.105
The court plays a critical role with judicial review of agency actions
involving nature’s trust. While a heightened close look is not outcome de-
terminative, it should provide a higher level of scrutiny to ensure the inter-
ests of the diffuse majority are protected.
C. Application of Nature’s Trust Canon
There are a variety of circumstances in which a court will be called
upon to adjudicate claims related to the administration of nature’s trust.
Some involve review of agency actions; others involve mandamus actions to
order the trustee to take protective actions, and yet others involve demand-
ing a clear statement and legislative finding of “no substantial impairment.”
i. the maintenance of waters in their natural state;
ii. the protection of domestic water use;
iii. the protection of water in the exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional
and customary rights; and
iv. the reservation of water enumerated by the State Water Code.
c. The agency is to apply a presumption in favor of public use, access, enjoyment,
and resource protection.
d. The agency should evaluate each proposal for use on a case-by-case basis, rec-
ognizing that there can be no vested rights in the use of public water.
e. If the requested use is private or commercial, the agency should apply a high
level of scrutiny.
f. The agency should evaluate the proposed use under a “reasonable and beneficial
use” standard, which requires examination of the proposed use in relation to other
public and private uses.
Applicants have the burden to justify the proposed water use in light of the trust purposes.
a. Permit applicants must demonstrate their actual needs and the propriety of
draining water from public streams to satisfy those needs.
b. The applicant must demonstrate the absence of a practicable alternative water
source.
c. If there is a reasonable allegation of harm to public trust purposes, then the
applicant must demonstrate that there is no harm in fact or that the requested use
is nevertheless reasonable and beneficial.
d. If the impact is found to be reasonable and beneficial, the applicant must im-
plement reasonable measures to mitigate the cumulative impact of existing and
proposed diversions on trust purposes, if the proposed use is to be approved.
Id. at 984-85 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 984-85.
105. Id. at 983-84.
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In this section, the Article discusses examples of courts in multiple jurisdic-
tions closely scrutinizing trustee action that appears to permit private actors
to diminish, pollute, or otherwise privatize the commons. In these cases,
courts in the United States, India, Kenya, and Uganda exhibit a high degree
of vigilance in protecting the public interest in shared resources against the
threats of privatization, often calling for a clear statement from the legisla-
ture before allowing a privatization.
1. United States
Legislative attempts at large-scale privatizations of nature’s trust are
common fodder for judicial review in the United States. Some jurisdictions,
such as Hawai’i, have clarified that “the public trust has never been under-
stood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for private commercial gain.”106
Similarly, Wisconsin courts maintain that any grant of public trust re-
sources for purely private purposes is void.107 An application to use com-
mon pool resources for private or commercial purposes requires an intense
level of scrutiny to ensure that such use is consistent with promoting the
public interest or that there is “no substantial impairment” to the public
interest in the remaining resources.108 This intensity of judicial review is
advanced by requiring the legislature to affirmatively craft a clear statement
and a legislative finding of “no substantial impairment” to the public inter-
est. State courts across the United States, such as those in Arizona, Alaska,
North Carolina, Michigan, and Maine, illustrate this growing trend.
i. Arizona
In Arizona Center for Law in Public Interest v. Hassell, the Arizona Court
of Appeals reviewed and rejected a statute that appeared to privatize all of
the navigable rivers in the state.109 Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, Ari-
zona “acquired title to the lands below the high-water mark in all navigable
watercourses” when it became a state in 1912.110 With the land and water
came obligations such as the state duty to administer the property consis-
106. Id. at 983 (quoting Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 450).
107. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927); Priewe v. Wis. State
Land & Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 781-82 (Wis. 1899).
108. Kauai Springs, Inc., 324 P.3d at 984. In applying this stricter public trust review of
an agency decision, the Supreme Court of Hawai’i upheld the local Planning Commission’s
decision to deny the permits for a spring water bottling facility because, among other things,
the applicant had not met its burden of showing the commercial use of water was consistent
with public trust protections of water. Id. at 989-90.
109. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162, 173 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991).
110. Id. at 162; see also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223, 229-30 (1845).
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tent with trust purposes.111 Yet, until 1985, the state did not assert any prop-
erty interests in these waterways with the exception of the Colorado
River.112 Once state officials started asserting public rights, there was a
strong backlash from private individuals and corporations that had for years
exercised control over, made improvements to, and paid taxes upon these
lands underlying navigable waters.113
In 1987, the Arizona Legislature enacted H.B. 2017 to relinquish the
state’s claims to these trust lands.114 The legislature’s stated statutory pur-
pose was:
to avoid a lengthy, difficult and expensive fact-finding effort and to
resolve this state’s claim by recognizing the titleholders’ accrued
equity in taxes, improvements and family and social ties and con-
firming titles of private parties and political subdivisions to lands
in the beds of waters other than the Colorado river and to compen-
sate this state for relinquishing the claim in those areas where the
state’s claim may be more viable. Monies received by this state as
compensation will be used to acquire riparian lands for public bene-
fit. This act also provides for public recreational use of surface
water in navigable watercourses.115
Thus, the Arizona Legislature explicitly acknowledged that it was attempt-
ing to relinquish its claim in these trust lands to address the backlash that
occurred after officials began asserting public rights. But, drawing on Illinois
Central, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the state’s responsibility
to manage public trust waterways for the public benefit was an “inabrogable
attribute of statehood.”116 Quoting from Illinois Central, the court reiterated:
“control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except
as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public
therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”117 Therefore, the Arizona
lawmakers could not simply legislate away the state’s duties to administer
trust assets to appease some constituents.
Further, in order to assess whether there was “no substantial impair-
ment,” the Arizona Court of Appeals drew on Idaho law and examined fac-
111. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (Miss. 1988); Defs. of
Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 728-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
112. Defs. of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 726.
113. See id. at 727.
114. Hassell, 837 P.2d at 161.
115. Id. at 162 (quoting Ariz. H.B. 2017 § 1(B) (1987)).
116. Id. at 168.
117. Id. at 167 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)).
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tors including “the degree of effect of the project on public trust uses,” “the
impact of the individual project on the public trust resource,” “the impact of
the individual project when examined cumulatively with existing impedi-
ments to full use of the public trust resource,” “the impact of the project on
the public trust resource when that resource is examined in light of the
primary purpose for which the resource is suited,” and “the degree to which
broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited or private ones.”118
Applying these factors, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the statute
was invalid because the legislature established no basis to assess the value as
a public resource of the parcels that it relinquished wholesale.119 Hence,
there was no clear legislative finding that the statute would not substantially
impair the public interest in the state’s navigable waterways.
In response to the Hassell decision, the Arizona Legislature passed a
new law that established a commission to make navigability determinations
and adjudicate claims.120 The Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed this new
attempt to privatize trust lands and again rejected it, this time holding that
the legislation used a navigability determination that was not as favorable to
public trust rights as the federal test of navigability established by the Su-
preme Court in The Daniel Ball.121 The court held that the navigability de-
termination provided for by the state statute was invalid and
unconstitutional because it was pre-empted by federal law.122 It prefaced
this holding by saying the court does not lightly conclude a statute is uncon-
stitutional.123 The court could find no reasonable alternative reading of the
statute to avoid the constitutional question, and reiterated, “because it is our
responsibility to give potential public trust forfeitures ‘a close look,’ we
must not merely rubberstamp the legislature’s decision.”124
ii. Alaska
The first Alaskan Supreme Court decision on the public trust doctrine
also involved the state legislature passing a statute that allowed for state-
wide privatization of public trust property.125 The Alaskan Legislature had
118. Id. at 170-71 (quoting Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671
P.2d 1085, at 1092-93 (1983)).
119. Id. at 172.
120. Defs. of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
121. Id. at 736 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870)). The Daniel Ball navigability
test provides that a body of water is considered to be navigable if on the date of statehood
the watercourse, in its natural and ordinary condition, either was used or was susceptible to
being used for travel or trade in any customary mode used on water. Id. at 730.
122. See id. at 737.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Hassell, 837 P.2d at 171).
125. CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1116-18 (Alaska 1988).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA201.txt unknown Seq: 26 26-APR-18 9:23
262 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 7:2
delegated to the Department of Natural Resources the authority to grant
patents of tidelands to private owners.126 The tideland patent at issue in the
case expressly reserved to the State of Alaska the mineral rights and prohib-
ited taking herring spawn, but was silent about public trust rights.127 The
dispute arose when the patent holder of the tidelands tried to stop someone
from fishing for salmon.128
In CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, the Alaskan Supreme Court applied the “no
substantial impairment” test to determine whether the privatization of pub-
lic tidelands furthered some specific public trust purpose or could be made
without substantial impairment to the trust asset.129 The Alaskan Supreme
Court explained that if “either of these questions can be answered in the
affirmative, conveyance free of the public trust would be permissible.”130
In determining whether or not such a conveyance would be permissible,
the Alaskan Supreme Court did not look to the patent holder’s use of the
property, but instead searched for the legislative intent in the plain lan-
guage of the statute.131 The legislative intent to convey tidelands free of the
public trust “must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied in the legisla-
tion authorizing the transfer,” because “[i]f any interpretation of the statute
which would retain the public’s interest in the tidelands is reasonably possi-
ble, we must give the statute such an interpretation.”132
Accordingly, the Alaskan Supreme Court held that the legislature con-
veyed the tidelands subject to a perpetual public trust easement because the
statute did not expressly state that the conveyance of tidelands “were given
in aid of navigation and commerce” or that the “lands in question would be
conveyed free of the public trust.”133 Further, the court found the legislative
intent to eliminate public trust rights could not be implied because Article
VIII, Section 3 of the Alaskan Constitution was in effect when the legisla-
ture enacted the statute, and it explicitly provides that “wherever occurring
in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for
common use.”134 The Alaskan Supreme Court will not presume the legisla-
ture intended an action, which on its face, is inconsistent with the plain
language of the Alaskan Constitution. Thus, the Alaskan Supreme Court
concluded that it was “not persuaded that this conveyance was made ‘in
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1117.
129. Id. at 1118.
130. Id. at 1119.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citation omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1120.
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furtherance of trust purposes’ such as would free the property from any
continuing public trust obligations.”135
Similarly, the Alaskan Supreme Court rejected the patent holder’s argu-
ment that extinguishing the public trust easement would not be a “substan-
tial impairment” of public rights because the patent holder’s property was so
small.136 The court instead looked at the fact that the statute applied to all
tidelands in the state and held that if the patents extinguished public rights
this would be a substantial impairment.137 Thus, private owners of tideland
are “prohibited from any general attempt to exclude the public from the
property by virtue of their title.”138
iii. North Carolina
In another ocean-facing state, this time on the Atlantic Ocean, the
North Carolina courts have honored the public trust doctrine and limited
privatization of ocean beaches to instances where clear legislative intent can
be found. In Gwathmey v. Department of Environment, Health, and Natural
Resources, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained how the public trust
doctrine operates as a rule of construction and creates presumptions the
court uses when interpreting legislative intent. Without calling it the na-
ture’s trust canon, the Supreme Court said: “Unless clear and specific words
state otherwise, terms are to be construed so as to cause no interference
with the public’s dominant trust rights, for the presumption is that the sov-
ereign did not intend to alienate such rights.”139 Thus, although the state
legislature may convey ownership of public trust land to a private party, the
state trustee must do so expressly and clearly.140
For North Carolina, public trust rights include the “right to freely use
and enjoy the State’s ocean and estuarine beaches and public access to the
beaches.”141 Under North Carolina’s Public Trust Statute, the state legisla-
ture defined ocean beaches to which the public has rights to include dry
sand areas, even some that are owned privately.142 In Nies v. Town of Emer-




138. Id. at 1121.
139. Gwathmey v. Dep’t of Env’t, Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 684 (N.C.
1995) (quoting RJR Technical Co. v. Pratt, 453 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1995)).
140. Id.
141. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 194 (N.C. App. 2015) (quoting
Friends of Hatteras Island Nat’l Historic Mar. Forest Land Tr. for Pres., Inc. v. Coastal Res.
Comm’n, 452 S.E.2d 337, 348 (1995)).
142. Id. at 195 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-45.1).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA201.txt unknown Seq: 28 26-APR-18 9:23
264 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 7:2
vate property owners who wished to exclude the public from the dry sand
portion of the beach to which they held private title. The court in Nies
opined that this was never in the “bundle of rights” they purchased, because
the ocean beaches of North Carolina “are subject to public trust rights un-
less those rights have been expressly abandoned by the State.”143 Specifi-
cally, the court in Nies held that a local ordinance that allowed driving on
the privately-owned dry sand portion of the beach was advancing a pro-
tected public trust right and so could not be a “taking” of private property
without just compensation by the government.144
iv. Michigan
Michigan courts have similarly applied the “no substantial impairment
test.”  In Glass v. Goeckel, the Michigan Supreme Court was called upon to
determine whether a woman trespassed when she walked on a Lake Huron
beach on property to which the Goeckel family held a deed.145 The Michi-
gan Supreme Court found no clear statement from the legislature extin-
guishing the traditional public trust right of passage accompanied by a
finding of “no substantial impairment,” and so it held the public trust ease-
ment continues and rejected the trespassing claim for beach walking.146
Again, as articulated in Arizona, Alaska, and North Carolina, if the legisla-
ture does not make its intention clear in express statutory terms, the pre-
sumption is that the public trust rights continue unimpeded by the private
deed. This is the nature’s trust canon in operation.
v. Maine
While this series of cases from Arizona, Alaska, North Carolina, and
Michigan, all resulted in rejecting an attempted privatization of trust re-
sources, the opposite result is also possible. The application of a clear state-
ment canon that demands a legislative finding of “no substantial
impairment” is not determinative of the result. Rather it is a tool judges use
to ensure they are properly interpreting legislative intent.  For instance, in a
case with facts similar to those discussed above, the Supreme Court of
Maine upheld a statute privatizing intertidal lands that had been filled and
treated as privately owned.
The Supreme Court of Maine described its standard of review regard-
ing legislative dispensations of state natural resources as “high and demand-
143. Id. at 197.
144. Id. at 198.
145. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 75 (Mich. 2005).
146. Id.
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ing.”147 Over the years, private landowners abutting the ocean had filled
many of Maine’s tidal lands and treated them as privately owned.148 In an
effort to clarify title and public trust rights, the Maine legislature enacted a
statute the court reviewed in Opinion of the Justices.149 The Supreme Court
of Maine justified its heightened review of public trust resources: “we be-
lieve that any legislation giving up any such public rights must satisfy a
particularly demanding standard of reasonableness.”150 Then it proceeded to
review a wide variety of legislative findings related to the impact on the
public interest and was ultimately satisfied with the legislative findings that
the public interest in the remaining intertidal and submerged lands would
not be impaired by legislation recognizing private title in intertidal lands
filled before a certain date.151 Thus, while the interpretive canon seeking a
clear statement and legislative finding will often provide a higher level of
court scrutiny and require more clarity from the political branches, the use
of nature’s trust canon is not determinative of the result.
2. India
In its first public trust doctrine case, the Indian Supreme Court in M.C.
Mehta v. Nath defined the scope of the doctrine to include “all eco-systems
operating in our natural resources.”152 The Indian Supreme Court sees the
public trust doctrine as “a tool for exerting long-established public rights
over short-term public rights and private gain.”153 The Court later clarified
that all natural resources are “held by the State as a trustee on behalf of the
people and especially the future generations.”154
In M.C. Mehta v. Nath, the Supreme Court of India considered the
legality of a classic example of a government agency official favoring a nar-
row private interest and attempting to privatize riverbed, floodplain, and
forest resources that had been a public commons.155 Specifically, the Court
considered whether Span Resort, which developed a tourist resort in Kullu-
Manali Valley, could dredge, blast, and otherwise block the flow of the Beas
147. Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981).
148. Id. at 598-99.
149. 12 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 559(1) (1981).
150. Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d at 607.
151. Id. at 610.
152. M.C. Mehta v. Nath, (1996) 10 SCR 12, 13 (India).
153. Ass’n for Env’t Prot. v. Kerala, (2013) 7 SCC 226, 232 (India).
154. Id. at 231-32 (quoting Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. v. Martins, (2009) 1 Unre-
ported Judgments 2009, 0411 (India)).
155. M.C. Mehta, 10 SCR at 12.
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River and create a new channel to divert the river to at least one kilometer
downstream, as well as build in a state forest.156
The Minister of Environment and Forests, Kamal Nath, approved the
project after developers initiated it without permission. In a rebuke of the
Minister, the Court reported that the resort development project aimed to
carry out “Kamal Nath’s dream of having a house on the bank of the Beas in
the shadow of the snow-capped Zanskar ranges.”157 The Court found that
Kamal Nath’s family members had business interests in the development
company.158
The Court ultimately held that the Span Resort project violated the
public trust doctrine. It voided the prior approvals and leases and ordered
restoration of the resources. Given that the leases to the company for
“purely commercial purposes” involved a “large area of the bank of the River
Beas which is part of a protected forest,” “ecologically fragile land,” and
“part of the riverbed,” the court had no hesitation in holding that the
Himachal Pradesh Government committed a patent breach of the public
trust held by the state government.159
In reaching this holding, the Supreme Court of India referenced U.S.
law and specifically cited Illinois Central160 before it applied something akin
to a nature’s trust canon, which put the onus on the elected law-making
body to provide a clear statement of intent when public natural resources
are leased to narrower commercial interests:
The resolution of this conflict in any given case is for the legisla-
ture and not the courts. If there is a law made by Parliament or the
State Legislature the courts can serve as an instrument of deter-
mining legislative intent in the exercise of its powers of judicial
review under the Constitution. But in the absence of any legisla-
tion, the executive acting under the doctrine of public trust cannot
abdicate the natural resources and convert them into private owner-
ship, or for commercial use.161
By looking for a clear statement from the “Parliament or State Legisla-
tures” before upholding a privatization of trust resources, the Supreme
Court of India shifted the locus of decision-making into a more public fo-
rum than is found at the agency level. Power is also more diffuse at the
156. Id. at 16-17.
157. Id. at 16.
158. Id. at 16-19.
159. Id. at 45.
160. See id. at 38-39.
161. Id. at 45.
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Parliament or Legislative branch than an individual Minister of Environ-
ment and Forests, who in this case had a personal and business interest in
the development project.162 This removes from agency discretion decisions
to privatize that have not been clearly expressed in legislation approved by
elected officials.
Interestingly, this example did not involve a court interpreting a stat-
ute, but an absence of legislation. In essence, the Court in M.C. Mehta is
saying the status quo is to guard public rights in the government-protected
trust of all natural resources and any decision to alter the status quo and
privatize the commons requires legislation.
In M.C. Mehta and subsequent cases, the Indian Supreme Court favora-
bly quoted Professor Sax to describe the court’s role in public trust cases:
“When a State holds a resource . . . for the free use of the general public, a
court will look with considerable scepticism upon any governmental con-
duct which is calculated either to relocate that resource to more restricted
uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.”163 The
Indian Supreme Court cited the U.S. Mono Lake case for the related princi-
ple that the public trust “is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect
the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands,
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandon-
ment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.”164 Echoing
Illinois Central’s “no substantial impairment” test, in M.C. Mehta v. Nath, the
court stated:
The esthetic use and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the
environment and the eco-systems of our country cannot be permit-
ted to be eroded for private, commercial or any other use unless the
courts find it necessary in good faith, for the public goods and in
public interest to encroach upon the said resources.165
Thus, the Indian Supreme Court has effectively established a presumption
against privatization that can only be rebutted if the Court is convinced that
the parliament or state legislature clearly expressed an intention to privatize
and found it did not substantially impair the public interest.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 39; M.I. Builders Private Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 464,
518 (India); see Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P., (2006) 3 SCC 549, 554-55,
575 (India).
164. M.C. Mehta, 10 SCR at 43 (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of
Alpine Cty, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983)).
165. Id. at 45.
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Building on this foundation, the Indian Supreme Court explained in
Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. & Ors. that the state trustee’s
duty to “protect the people’s common heritage” requires a “more demand-
ing” level of judicial scrutiny of government actions than required for “the
government’s general obligation to act for the public benefit.”166 This con-
troversy arose in the drought-prone region of Rayala Seema.167 The Su-
preme Court was called upon to review a decision by Tirupathi Urban
Development Authority (TUDA), a state agency, to alienate lands that had
been used as “tank beds”—systems of water storage that allow surface water
to be used for drinking, irrigating crops, and percolating down to replenish
the groundwater supply.168 The development of these lands for rental hous-
ing for government employees, a public interest, was in direct conflict with
the public interest of protecting scarce water resources in an area that was
rapidly gaining population; as the water table dropped, the concentration of
toxic salts and fluorides increased.169
Not only did the Court reference Indian cases, but it also noted the
responsibility of the state to protect the environment is found in interna-
tional law.170 Specifically, the Court referenced the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment’s Stockholm Convention, to which India
was a party, which declares: “The natural resources of the earth . . . must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through care-
ful planning or management, as appropriate.”171
The Court oriented its analysis of the conflict over these public trust
resources by shifting the focus to the legislature and refusing to allow an
administrative agency in the executive branch to privatize resources in the
absence of legislation directing it to do so.172 The Court declared, “there is
no doubt about the fact that there is a responsibility bestowed upon the
Government to protect and preserve the tanks.”173 The Court merged pub-
lic trust concepts, starting with Illinois Central, with sustainable develop-
ment concepts to support the Court’s search for development that fully
integrates environmental protection and does not compromise the resource
needs of future generations.174 In balancing the need for housing against the
need for water protection, the Court was persuaded by a variety of factors,
166. Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi, 3 SCC at 575.
167. Id. at 556.
168. Id. at 558.
169. Id. at 557, 576-77.
170. Id. at 572.
171. Id. (citing Stockholm Convention, ¶ 2 (1972)).
172. Id. at 571-72 (quoting M.C. Mehta v. Nath, (1996) 10 SCR 12, 14 (India)).
173. Id. at 572.
174. Id. at 574-75.
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including that the housing was for middle and upper incomes so the absence
of it would leave no one homeless, and an expert report on methods to
revitalize the water storage capacity of the tanks.175 The Court’s order re-
jecting further housing development, but not ordering existing buildings to
be removed, reflected these recommendations.176
While Intellectuals Forum shows how the court balances sustainable de-
velopment concerns, the Union of India v. Center for Public Interest Litigation
shows the breadth of India’s concept of public natural resources.  There, the
Center for Public Interest Litigation sued India for selling wireless
wavelengths on the 2G spectrum on a first-come-first-served basis rather
than by auction.177 The Supreme Court of India reviewed whether the “gov-
ernment has the right to alienate, transfer or distribute natural resources/
national assets” in a manner that is not fair and transparent, and ultimately
quashed the licenses the agency had issued because they did not comport
with these standards.178 The case is of interest here because of the Supreme
Court’s definition of natural resources and the Court’s discussion of the
method of resource alienation.
The Court defined “natural resources” as elements of the natural envi-
ronment that are “renewable or nonrenewable,” “provide economic and so-
cial services to human society, and are considered valuable in their relatively
unmodified, natural, form.”179 The Court held that internet spectrum is a
natural resource, and as such is held in trust for the people of India.180
As discussed, the Indian Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta held that natu-
ral resources are vested in a government-held trust.181 Thus it is the govern-
ment’s duty “to protect the national interest and natural resources must
always be used in the interests of the country and not private interests.”182
Like the Illinois Central “no substantial impairment” test, Indian jurispru-
dence has not prohibited the privatization of natural resources categorically;
instead, it maintains that when alienating “scarce natural resources like spec-
trum” the state has a burden “to ensure that a nondiscriminatory method is
adopted for distribution and alienation, which would necessarily result in
175. Id. at 578-79.
176. Id. at 579-80.
177. Ctr. for Pub. Interest Litig. v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCR 147, 147-48, 232-33
(India).
178. Id. at 177. The court referenced the Equality Clause of the Indian Constitution as
the basis for a fair and transparent method. Id.
179. Id. at 241.
180. Id. at 243-46.
181. M.C. Mehta v. Nath, (1996) 10 SCR 12, 13 (India).
182. Ctr. for Pub. Interest Litig., 3 SCR 147 at 42 (describing the holding in M.C.
Mehta, 10 SCR 12).
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protection of national/public interest.”183 This distribution process must be
guided by constitutional principles including the doctrine of equality and
ensure no action is detrimental to the larger public interest.184
The Court declared that Illinois Central is “part of the Indian jurispru-
dence” and the heart of the public trust doctrine is that it places duties on
the government trustee to make decisions that protect future generations.185
The Supreme Court described this duty as extending to the Court to exer-
cise jurisdiction to ensure the state is protecting the public interest, indicat-
ing a higher level of scrutiny in its judicial review, before rejecting the
spectrum licenses the agency had issued.186
3. Kenya
One way the commons is privatized is by allowing private entities to
pollute and degrade that which is shared by many. A river that is a shared
source of drinking water and other domestic uses, but also a recipient of
polluted wastes, is an example of this. When such a situation presented
itself in Kenya, the High Court of Kenya applied the public trust doctrine,
among other laws, to ultimately order the Ministry of Water, the Nairobi
Water Services Board, and the Olkejuado County Council to construct sew-
age treatment facilities.187
In Waweru v. Republic, the case originated as a criminal charge against
owners of private plots in the Kiserian Township who were charged with
discharging raw sewage into a public river.188 These owners were developers
of residential and commercial buildings who were supposed to manage the
waste by use of septic tanks, but who placed overflow pipes on these tanks
183. Id. at 245-46.
184. Id. at 241-42, 248.
As natural resources are public goods, the doctrine of equality, which emerges
from the concepts of justice and fairness, must guide the State in determining the
actual mechanism for distribution of natural resources. In this regard, the doctrine
of equality has two aspects: first, it regulates the rights and obligations of the State
vis-à-vis its people and demands that the people be granted equitable access to
natural resources and/or its products and that they are adequately compensated for
the transfer of the resource to the private domain; and second, it regulates the
rights and obligations of the State vis-à-vis private parties seeking to acquire/use
the resource and demands that the procedure adopted for distribution is just, non-
arbitrary and transparent and that it does not discriminate between similarly
placed private parties.
Id. at 246.
185. Id. at 243-44.
186. Id. at 255-56.
187. Waweru v. Republic, (2007) AHRLR 149 (KeHC 2006) (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
188. Id. at 149-50.
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and discharged raw sewage.189 The Court discovered the government agen-
cies that were responsible for building a sewage treatment facility had not
done so and instead the land acquired for that purpose had been put to
private use.190
The Court was concerned about how raw sewage would harm the use of
the river by people and livestock downstream.191 It interpreted the Kenyan
Constitution’s right to life, Section 71, in an expansive manner to include
the right to a clean and healthy environment, based in part, on natural
law.192 Although the decision included international customary law on sus-
tainable development, precautionary principle, and polluter pays, it also in-
volved the public trust doctrine: “the essence of the public trust is that the
state, as trustee, is under a fiduciary duty to deal with the trust property,
being the common natural resources, in a manner that is in the interests of
the general public.”193
After this summation of the public trust doctrine, the Court favorably
cited two Pakistani cases that similarly interpreted national constitutional
provisions guaranteeing a right to life to include a right to a clean environ-
ment to be managed as a public trust.194 Then the court reasoned that the
Water Ministry and the County Council were responsible for establishing
sewage treatment facilities based on statutory and public trust duties, be-
cause “[i]n the case of land resources, forests, wetlands and waterways to
give some examples the government and its agencies are under a public
trust to manage them in a way that maintains a proper balance between the
economic benefits of development with the needs of a clean environ-
ment.”195 Before ordering the government entities to build sewage treat-
ment facilities, the court opined that “water was given to us by the Creator
and in whatever form it should never ever be the privilege of a few—the
same applies to the right to a clean environment.”196
After this case, Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010, which ex-
pressly incorporated the right to a clean and healthy environment and pub-
lic trust principles.197 Article 26 still contains the right to life, but now
Article 42 contains the right to a clean and healthy environment for present
189. Id. at 151-52.
190. Id. at 152.
191. Id. at 155-56.
192. Id. at 156.
193. Id. at 158.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 160.
196. Id. at 163.
197. See CONSTITUTION (2010) (Kenya).
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and future generations.198 Additionally, Article 62 states that the national
government owns public lands “in trust for the people of Kenya and [they]
shall be administered on their behalf by the National Land Commission.”199
Taken together, these constitutional provisions provide the Kenyan courts a
strong basis to scrutinize trustee actions when a privatization appears to be
underway and demand a clear statement from the legislature that a priva-
tization has “no substantial impairment” to the public interest.
4. Uganda
In Uganda, the High Court of Uganda applied a constitutionally-based
public trust doctrine to protect a forest reserve from privatization by a sugar
plantation. In Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment v. Attor-
ney General, the High Court of Uganda reviewed the legality of a 50-year
land use permit to allow the Kakira Sugar Works, an Asian company, to turn
the Butamira Forest Reserve into a sugar plantation.200
Established in 1929 by the national government (at that time Busoga
Kingdom Government), the Butamira Forest Reserve, that spanned 5.4
square miles, was a classic commons, a forest that local communities de-
pended on for their livelihood through agroforestry and as a water sup-
ply.201 Kakira Sugar Works had previously leased the forest property to
obtain firewood, but the lease had not allowed the company to turn the
forest reserve into a sugar plantation.202 In 1997, Kakira Sugar Works again
applied to the Ugandan Forestry Department for a permit to convert the
forest reserve into their private sugar plantation, and this time the agency
issued the permit.203 After the local communities that used the forest pro-
tested, the Forest Minister took the issue to Parliament, which passed a
motion to allow Kakira Sugar Works to convert the forest to a private sugar
plantation.204
The Court reviewed the legislation and held that it violated the public
trust doctrine as enshrined in Uganda’s Constitution. Article 237(2)(b) of
the Ugandan Constitution provides the government “shall hold in trust for
198. Id. arts. 26, 42.
199. Id. arts. 62, 42, 21; see also id. art. 69 (containing environmental provisions related
to government management and equitable sharing).
200. Advocates Coal. for Dev. & Env’t v. Attorney Gen. (ACODE), (2004) Misc.
Cause No. 0100, 14 (Uganda), https://www.ecolex.org/details/court-decision/advocates-coali
tion-for-development-and-environment-acode-v-attorney-general-606187d3-09b8-4fbf-8859-
5e2face91652/.
201. Id. at 4-6.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 5-6.
204. Id. at 7.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA201.txt unknown Seq: 37 26-APR-18 9:23
Spring 2018] Privatization of Public Environmental Resources 273
the people” a wide variety of natural resources, including “forest
reserves.”205 The court held that it is clear that the “Butamira Forest Re-
serve is land which the government of Uganda holds in trust for the people
of Uganda to be protected for the common good of the citizens.”206 In ac-
cordance with a statute carrying out the constitutional provisions, the gov-
ernment can issue permits to use trust lands; however, in addition to
approval by Parliament, this statute requires consent from the local commu-
nity in the area around the reserved land.207 In this case the Court had
evidence that the government trustees had approved the permit in spite of
local protests against the permit.208 Accordingly, the Court in Advocates
Coalition held this was a breach of the public trust doctrine because the local
community did not approve, and rescinded the permit.209
Unlike the other public trust cases in this Article, the Uganda example
gives voice to the beneficiaries of the trust and requires their consent before
allowing a privatization. The High Court of Uganda rejected the Parlia-
ment’s and the Forestry Minister’s approval of the permit on the basis that a
third essential party, the beneficiaries, did not consent to a permit that
would have allowed a private corporation to destroy the forest reserve they
relied on for food, fuel, and water.
In sum, the pattern of the cases from the United States, India, Kenya,
and Uganda, show the significant role the judicial branch plays in protecting
nature’s trust from privatization. The judicial review in these cases is exact-
ing and can involve ordering the government trustees to take actions. When
statutory interpretation is part of the case, the application of a substantive
canon demanding a clear statement from the legislature that they intend to
privatize the commons and that it is either in the public interest or there is
“no substantial impairment” ensures the court is accurately interpreting leg-
islative intent consistent with a presumption of protection. The interests of
the diffuse majority of trust beneficiaries is furthered by the courts ensuring
the political branch is fully engaged in a transparent process to assess the
public’s interests in any privatization of nature’s trust.  Beneficiaries’ inter-
ests are furthered even more by Uganda’s approach, which despite clarity
from the Parliament in favor of privatization, required local beneficiary
approval.
205. Id. at 14 (citing CONSTITUTION art. 237(2)(b) (1995) (Uganda)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 16, 23.
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IV. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE POWER OF
FRAMING THE STATUS QUO
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch expressed a classic conserva-
tive critique of using courts to resolve policy questions, even those that are
rooted in an interpretation of the Constitution: “As a society, we lose the
benefit of the give-and-take of the political process and the flexibility of
social experimentation that only the elected branches can provide.”210 Jus-
tice Gorsuch maintains that politicization of the judiciary diminishes its
legitimacy, and treats judges as “little more than politicians with robes.”211
Recognition of a substantive canon for nature’s trust should be welcomed by
those who oppose the politicization of the judiciary, as it shifts the judicial
focus to the legislature in search of a clear statement and finding of “no
substantial impairment” of the public interest when privatizing nature’s
trust.
Further, the concern about politicizing the judiciary manifests in decid-
ing whether a case is properly before the court, or justiciable. The principle
that courts should not adjudicate political questions stems primarily from
adhering to the separation of powers, and maintaining the distinct roles of
the judiciary and the political branches of government. But merely charac-
terizing a case as political should not render it immune from judicial scru-
tiny. Courts regularly adjudicate claims that are politically charged, such as
the 2017 interpretation of the Trump Administration’s first travel ban.212 As
Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “[t]here is hardly any political question in
the United States that sooner or later does not turn into a judicial
question.”213
In the United States, deciding whether a claim is justiciable depends, in
part, on whether the case requires the court to answer questions that are
better directed to the legislative or executive branches of government.214 If
it is a political question, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.215
Courts apply the political question doctrine to extricate themselves from
questions that involve policy choices and value determinations constitution-
ally committed to the political branches of the legislature and executive.
The test the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Baker v. Carr involves six
210. Neil Gorsuch, Liberals ’N’ Lawsuits, THE NAT’L REV. (Feb. 7, 2005), http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/213590/liberalsnlawsuits-joseph-6.
211. Id.
212. Exec. Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
213. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 441 (Liberty Fund 2012),
oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2284.
214. See Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Alaska 2014).
215. Id.
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elements, one or more of which will be “prominent on the surface” of any
case involving a political question:
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sue to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)]
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from mul-
tifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.216
If one of the Baker elements is “inextricable” from the case, dismissal on
political question grounds is appropriate.217
Although the political question doctrine and clear statement canons are
animated by separation of powers concerns, and result in requiring a deci-
sion from the political branches, the argument that a court should abstain
from adjudicating based on the political question doctrine is the inverse of
the clear statement canon for nature’s trust. The critical juncture is deter-
mining the status quo. If the starting point presumption is the trustees have
a duty to the beneficiaries and nature’s trust cannot be privatized without a
clear statement from Congress demonstrating the action is in the public
interest, then the court must closely scrutinize trustee action to ensure the
duties are upheld. Here, the political question doctrine cannot be a barrier
to adjudication. The court should adjudicate and determine whether the
political branches have provided sufficiently clear statements and findings
demonstrating their action is in the public interest. By contrast, if the status
quo is to allow privatization of the commons and in order to stop a priva-
tization, the legislature or executive needs to act, then the court may find it
should not adjudicate because it is a political question better left to the
discretion of the political branches.
Two cases involving litigants asserting the government has a duty to
protect the public trust in the atmosphere or climate demonstrate the power
of framing the status quo. In Kanuk v. State Department of Natural Resources,
when U.S. litigants asked the Supreme Court of Alaska to hold that Alaska’s
public trust duty included protecting the atmosphere and that the level of
216. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (classifying the political question doctrine
as an issue of justiciability).
217. Id.
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protection be dictated by the best available science, the Supreme Court of
Alaska punted based on the political question doctrine.218 Instead, the court
held that the “limited institutional role of the judiciary supports a conclu-
sion that the science- and policy-based inquiry here is better reserved for
executive-branch agencies or the legislature.”219 The court went on to ac-
knowledge that when it comes to interpreting the state constitution and
questions about the existence of a public trust related to protecting the at-
mosphere, the court has a constitutional mandate to ensure compliance with
the constitution.220 But because the court had already decided, based on
political question, that it could not grant relief to the plaintiffs, it declined
to decide whether the state had a public trust duty and had breached its
fiduciary duties to protect the atmosphere from greenhouse gases.221 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that its past application of the public trust doctrine
has “been as a restraint on the State’s ability to restrict public access to
public resources, not as a theory for compelling regulation of those re-
sources.”222 If the Alaskan Supreme Court’s starting point had instead been
that its role is to scrutinize the political branches’ duties to protect nature’s
trust (including the atmosphere), it would be abdicating an essential over-
sight function by failing to find it had subject matter jurisdiction.
By contrast, soon after the U.S. Presidential election of 2016, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon ruled in a major public trust and
constitutional due process case to address climate disruption.223 In addition
to the findings discussed in Part I, the Juliana court ruled against the United
States’ motion to dismiss based on arguments that the case raised non-justi-
ciable political questions, among other arguments.224 It found nothing ap-
proaching a clear reference to the subject matter of this case in the text of
the Constitution committing the issue exclusively to another branch.225 The
court found the first Baker element inapplicable because climate change pol-
icy is “not a fundamental power on which any other power allocated exclu-
sively to other branches of government rests.”226 If the court’s proper role is
to provide an avenue for beneficiaries of the trust to assert legally-protected




222. Id. at 1102.
223. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
224. Id. at 1234.
225. Id. at 1238. (“[T]he question is whether adjudicating a claim would require the
Judicial Branch to second-guess decisions committed exclusively to another branch of
government.”).
226. Id.
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rights and grant relief when the government trustee fails to carry out its
duties, the first Baker element should not be an obstacle in a nature’s trust
case.
The court found the second and third elements inapplicable, reasoning
that it is within the court’s competence to determine what emissions level
would be sufficient to redress their injuries and that the court can answer
the questions at issue without considering competing economic and other
interests.227 The court cautioned that just because a case is complex does
not make it non-justiciable.228 Further, the plaintiffs are seeking a court
declaration that U.S. environmental policy infringes their “fundamental
rights” and that directs the “agencies to conduct a consumption-based inven-
tory of United States CO2 emissions, and use that inventory to ‘prepare
and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel
emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2 so as to stabilize the
climate system and protect [ ] vital resources.’ ”229 The court could provide
this relief.230 The court was also not persuaded that because the case con-
cerns constitutional as opposed to statutory violations the court lacks any
legal standards; courts regularly decide constitutional due process claims.231
The court found the fourth through sixth factors inapplicable and con-
cluded that it could grant the plaintiffs’ relief without expressing disrespect
for the political branches.232 Nor did the court see evidence of an “ ‘unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made’ or
any ‘potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.’”233 The court concluded that “[a]t its
heart, this lawsuit asks this Court to determine whether defendants have
violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. That question is squarely within
the purview of the judiciary.”234 The court was particularly persuaded by
the fact that youth plaintiffs “must depend on others to protect their politi-
cal interests” and that their claims are rooted in a “diminishment of their
voice in representational government.”235 Thus, in a nature’s trust case, the
understanding of separation of powers is informed by the judiciary’s proper
role as supervising the political branches carrying out trust duties; and that
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1239.
229. Id. (citation omitted).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1240-41.
233. Id. at 1241 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 269 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
234. Id.
235. Id. (citation omitted).
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role is heightened in the context of youth and future generations who are
part of a vote-less diffuse majority.
Those concepts are also present in the now famous public trust case in
the Philippines, Oposa v. The Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.236 In Oposa,
children brought a class action challenging the Department of Environmen-
tal and Natural Resources’ issuance of timber licenses.237 The petitioners
claimed the acts of the agency misappropriated or impaired the Philippine
rainforests and the vital life support systems they supply.238 They alleged
that in the twenty five years prior to bringing the case, the rainforests in the
Philippines went from 53% to only 2.8% of the country’s land mass, and
that the government had issued licenses to commercial logging of more than
the total remaining forests.239
The government argued the issue of not renewing or granting timber
license agreements for clear-cutting was a political question for the legisla-
ture or executive.240 The Supreme Court of the Philippines disagreed that
policy formulation was an issue in the case.241 It went on to explain that
even if policy were an issue, the Philippine Constitution gives the judicial
branch the power “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdic-
tion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”242
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine Constitution, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court of the Philippines, allows judicial review—even of polit-
ical questions—if there has been a “grave abuse of discretion” by a political
branch.243
The Supreme Court of the Philippines held in 1993 that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is grounded in the national constitution, but
that “these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.”244 These
rights carry with them “the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
236. Oposa v. The Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A
792, 803-04 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
237. Id. at 795-96.
238. Id.  at 796-98.
239. Id. at 798.
240. Id. at 810-11.
241. Id. at 804-05.
242. Id. at 803-04 (quoting CONST. (1987), art. VIII, § 1 (Phil.)).
243. Id. (quoting CONST. (1987), art. VIII, § 1 (Phil.)).
244. Id. at 804 (citing CONST. (1987), art. II, §§ 15-16 (Phil.): “SEC. 16. The State shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”; “SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.”).
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environment.”245 The rights give rise to a cause of action. In a first of its
kind ruling, the Court held that the plaintiffs can sue on behalf of future
generations, based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” to
protect the next generation’s constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.246
In the Philippines, the scope of the public trust includes all natural
resources.247 The constitutional right involves “the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.”248
The Oposa Court reviewed Philippine President Corazon C. Aquino’s
Executive Order identifying the primary trustee of these natural resources
and the need for intergenerational responsibility.249 That executive order
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Re-
sources “shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conser-
vation, management, development and proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources. . . to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future genera-
tions of Filipinos.”250 Thus, the Supreme Court held the plaintiffs had a
valid cause of action to attempt to cancel logging licenses in order to protect
the remaining rainforests for existing and future generations, and that the
court had jurisdiction because this was not a political question.251 Like in
Juliana, the court in Oposa was animated by protecting the rights of those
with a muted political voice, and understood the status quo to be protecting
public rights in nature’s trust, which requires the political branch trustees to
adhere to judicially enforceable duties.
In cases involving nature’s trust, the judicial branch plays a critical role
in ensuring the political branch trustees are protecting the beneficiaries’
interests. When the rights of future generations are at stake, who of course
have no political representation, a bar to the courts based on political ques-
tion grounds is misplaced. When the status quo is to keep nature’s trust in
the commons and protect against privatizations, the court adjudicates and
determines whether the political branches have provided sufficiently clear
245. Id. at 805.
246. Id. at 802-03.
247. Id. at 806.
248. Id. at 807.
249. Id. at 806.
250. Id. (quoting ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, § 4, Exec. Ord. No. 192 (Phil.)).
251. Id. at 809-12.
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statements and findings demonstrating their action or inaction is in the
public interest.
CONCLUSION
Drinking water, beaches, a livable climate, clean air, forests, fisheries,
and parks are all commons, shared by many users with diffuse and overlap-
ping interests. These public natural resources are susceptible to depletion,
overuse, erosion, and extinction, and they are under increasing pressures to
privatize and keep out the public. The public trust doctrine provides a legal
basis to guard against privatizing important public resources. As such, na-
ture’s trust is a critical doctrine to counter the ever-increasing enclosure and
privatization of the commons as well as to order government trustees to
take action that protects the diffuse majority of current and future genera-
tions. The judiciary’s role in nature’s trust is to guard the public interest and
ensure the political branches are accountable trustees. Judicial skepticism
when privatization of the commons is underway has manifested into some-
thing that should now be recognized as a substantive canon of statutory
interpretation that looks for a clear statement from the legislature and find-
ing of “no substantial impairment” of the public interest and a heightened
close look at agency action. Such an approach furthers democracy by ensur-
ing elected representatives in the legislature have publicly considered and
expressed their intent to authorize a privatization of nature’s trust backed by
findings that it is in the public interest. This moves the locus of decision-
making away from administrative agencies and back to the democratically-
elected legislature. When the court understands its role in the trustee rela-
tionships and the status quo as protecting the commons from privatization,
the political question doctrine should not be a viable obstacle to adjudicat-
ing controversies about privatizing nature’s trust.
